I previously cited Nagel’s What is it Like to Be a Bat (What is it Like to Be you) but I want to bring it up again.
The structure is really just a shell, very weak in utilitarian terms, but very high in experience (quality, bat-ness).
I have previously argued (aggressively) against the reliance on efficiency as a mean for long term innovation, and I am going to recruit Nagel’s point to my benefit here.
A Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena, though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world.
The objective nature of the things picked out by these concepts could be apprehended by him because, although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not: they are observable-from the point of view but external to it; hence they can be comprehended from other points of view also, either by the same organisms or by others.
In speaking of the move from subjective to objective characterization, I wish to remain noncommittal about the existence of an end point, the completely objective intrinsic nature of the thing, which one might or might not be able to reach.